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‘par  for  the course’ and  the anticipated governmental outcome post‑election 
in  Northern  Ireland,  Scotland  and  Wales.  In  each  of  these  countries  post‑
devolution  constitutional  rules  and  electoral  procedures  all  contain  within 
them provision for a more proportional  legislature. Despite coalition politics 
being the anticipated ‘normal’ politics in the Celtic periphery, the irony is that 





same  alarm  and  the  political  spin  that  accompanied  the  formation  of  the 
coalition  ‑  that  it  was  a  necessity  due  to  the  UK’s  urgent  economic  crisis 
association with spiraling public sector debt – appeared rather manufactured. 
In  2010  Scotland  had  already  experienced  three  years  of  stable  minority 




government being unstable was more a  judgement of  the  internal politics of 




term meant  that  the  UK General  Election  of  2015  would  coincide  with  the 
scheduled  devolved  2015  elections.  Faced  with  the  prospect  of  UK  and 




policy  impact,  is  less  tangible  in  Northern  Ireland,  Scotland  and  Wales 
principally  because  devolution  contains,  as  part  of  its  design,  an  umbrella 
sheltering  each  territory  from some parts of UK Government policy agenda 
they  do  not  want  to  pursue.  The  UK  Government’s  policies  in  areas  like 
education, social and health care stop at the English border.  It became clearer 
in each area that, post‑devolution, significant political power now lies beyond 
Westminster  and Whitehall.  There was  no more  vivid manifestation  of  that 
than on the 18th September 2014 when the future sovereignty of Scotland was 






Coalition  Government  have  carried  on  the  now  established  tradition  of 
increased  flexibility  of  unionist  political  parties  in  their  approaches  to  the 




with  increased  autonomy  in  the Celtic  nations.  The UK when  viewed  from 
beyond Westminster can no longer credibly be conceived of as a unitary state, 
it is now quite clearly a state of asymmetrical unions. Indeed for a brief period 
in  September  2014  referendum campaign  (after  the  first  poll  showing  a Yes 
lead), there was the rather bizarre situation of Gordon Brown, a former Prime 





The  Coalition  Government  inherited  commitments  to  extend  more 
devolutionary powers  to Scotland and Wales.  It has carried  forward on  this 
commitment.  In  Scotland  it  responded  to  the  SNP’s  2011  landslide  election 
victory and commitment to holding a referendum on Scotland’s membership 
of  the  United  Kingdom  by  negotiating  and  agreeing  on  the  terms  of  that 
referendum.  In Wales,  there was more  stability,  but  the  trajectory  of  travel 
was also enhanced autonomy. The knock‑on effect of  these developments  in 
Northern  Ireland meant  that  constitutional politics  remained never  far  from 
its agenda.  
 
A  second,  notable development  ‑  that  has  largely  gone under  the  radar  ‑  is 
that  the  legitimacy  question  has  been  removed  from  politics  beyond 
Westminster.  From  the  1970s  politics  was  dominated,  albeit  in  radically 
different ways, by notions of a democratic and political  legitimacy deficit  in 
Scotland,  Northern  Ireland  and  Wales.    Different  forms  of  politics,  the 
inflexibility  and  weakness  of  the  Conservative  Party,  as  well  as  their 
perceived  inflexible  approach  to  the  union,  led  to  increasing  demands  for 
more autonomy. Post‑2010  those concerns were not heard. The combination 
of devolution and the Liberal Democrat inclusion in government has allowed 




Despite  all  the  pre‑devolution  talk  of  new  politics  and  Westminster  as  a 
negative  template,  as  it  has  evolved  the  legislatures  in  both  Scotland  and 
Wales  have  gradually  taken  on  more  of  the  features  of  the  Westminster 
  4
arrangements.1  Northern Ireland, with its own distinctive arrangements, has 
remained  something  of  a  case  apart.  However,  the  new  legislatures  in  all 
three  countries  are  now  widely  accepted  as  the  politically  legitimate  and 
democratically accountable bodies in all three countries. In Northern Ireland 
the armed struggle republican tradition has been sidelined with mainstream 
Irish  republicanism  now  participating  in  relatively  stable  joint  governance 
arrangements  with  the  Democratic  Unionist  Party.  Devolution  has  shifted 
perceptions  amongst  Northern  Irish,  Scottish  and  Welsh  electorates  about 
where  political  power  and  authority  is  and  should  be.  Despite  previous 
projections  of  the  doomsday  scenario  of  a  Conservative  led  Westminster 
Government facing off to nationalist led (or influenced) administrations in the 
periphery, intergovernmental relations have remained cordial with each side 















The  chapter  has  been  structured  around  these  three  themes.  In  discussing 
each, reflections are made on developments in Northern Ireland, Scotland and 
Wales.    Inevitably, as a  result of  size and  the  importance of  the  referendum 







pp.  117‑133.  Paul  Cairney  and  James  Johnston    ‘What  is  the  Role  of  the  Scottish 






A  key  theme  of  this  chapter  is  that  the  coalition  government  have  carried 
forward  the  trajectory  of  new  unionism  in  British  politics.  Primarily  this 
reflected  that  the  constitutional  conservatism  of  pre‑1997  UK  Government 
was eschewed  in  favour of  carrying on  the  trajectory of post‑1997  territorial 
governance. Devolution  has  proved  to  be  an  ongoing process  rather  than  a 
series of singular events in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales.  
 
The  2012  Scotland Act3 was  a  grudging,  incremental  adjustment  to  the  1999 
devolution arrangements. It was always unlikely to promote stability. Indeed 
















The  Coalition  Government  faced  Governments  in  all  three  peripheries 
without  any  Conservative  or  Liberal  Democrat  representation.  Although 
there was potential for antagonism inter‑governmental relations, aided by the 
diplomatic  skills  and  culture  of  a  shared  civil  service,  remain  remarkably 
smooth.  
 
David  Cameron  had  previously  written  of  the  union  as  a  ‘constitutional 
masterstroke’. 5    Cameron  has  also  challenged  the  ‘at  best  widespread 
ambivalence,  and  at worst  prevailing  animosity’6 in  England,  as well  as  the 











the  consequences  of  going  it  alone,  suggesting  the  case  for  the Union must 
also  appeal  to  the  heart.  Whilst  in  opposition  Cameron  had  previously 
acknowledged,  ‘small,  independent  and  thriving  economies  across  Europe 
such  as  Finland,  Switzerland  and  Norway.  It  would  be  wrong  to  suggest 
Scotland could not be another successful, independent country’. 7  
 






The  Scottish  referendum  campaign  provides  an  illustrative  example  of  the 
slippage of power from Westminster. The two parties of the coalition, whilst 
not  bystanders, were  supporting  actors  in  the  tribal war  of  attrition  led  by 
Labour on the No side and the Scottish National Party on the Yes side. David 
Cameron,  Prime  Minister  and  Nick  Clegg,  Deputy  Prime  Minister  largely 




The  campaign  itself,  especially  in  its  latter  days,  had  an  intensity  rarely  (if 
ever)  seen  in  electoral  politics  in  the UK.  It was  prone  to much  hyperbolic 







No    2,001,926   55.3% 





3.2  ‑   but were widely seen  to have  ‘lost’  the campaign despite winning  the 
vote.   Much of the Better Together campaign was labeled ‘Project Fear’ such 





and  retailers  warning  of  price  increases.8 George  Robertson  former  Labour 
Defence Minister and NATO chief, outlined warnings of independence being 

















and  nuclear  war.  Vote  yes,  says  Osborne,  and  old  men  will  starve  in  the 
gutter  and  wee  bairns  erupt  in  boils’. 12.  The  aspiration  of  setting  out  a 
positive case  for  the union was  lost and,  for a brief period during  the  latter 
stages  of  the  campaign,  Scotland’s  union with  the  rest  of  the UK  looked  in 
serious  jeopardy.  Serious  questions  were  being  asked  about  the  knock‑on 
implications  of  independence  or  enhanced  devolution  for  governance  in 
Northern  Ireland,  Wales  and  the  English  regions.  After  the  conclusive  No 












12 Jenkins,  Simon,  ‘Scotland’s  New  Era  Beckons  regardless  of  how  it  votes  in  a  stupid 




enhanced devolution  to Scotland with  ‘English Votes  for English Laws’ and 
the potential for constitutional reform across the whole of the UK.13 
 
Whilst devolution sheltered  the Celtic periphery  from much as  the coalition 
government’s  social  policy  agenda,  the  politics  of  austerity  and  welfare 
reform were major issues in all three countries. Indeed, one could even argue 
that  the UK Government’s welfare reform agenda had an enhanced saliency 
in  the  Celtic  periphery  because  it  remained  the  only  area  of  social  policy 
where it can have an impact (the others being largely devolved). The umbrella 




use of  social housing. Like  the poll  tax  three decades previously,  its  official 
title was replaced in popular discourse by those campaigning for its abolition. 
The  bedroom  tax  and  other  related welfare  reforms  tend  to  be  narrated  as 
Westminster inspired cuts in welfare support in the periphery. 14 This reform 
had  potentially  a  larger  impact  beyond Westminster  as  social  housing was 




Although  more  reconciliatory  in  terms  of  territorial  management  and 
constitutional  politics  than  the  previous  Conservative  led  UK Government, 
the  ‘bread  and  butter’  coalition  programme  followed  a  rather  Thatcherite 
agenda  of  fiscal  austerity,  public  sector  retrenchment,  privatization  (NHS, 
Royal  Mail)  and  welfare  cuts.  Whilst  such  policies  undoubtedly  have 




agenda  and  dislike  of  the Conservative  party were  a  key  strand  of  the  Yes 













Given  the  financial  control  the  UK  Government  continues  to  enjoy,  the 
location of key banking and financial institutions, it is perhaps inevitable that 
most  of  the  public  blame  for  austerity  in  the  periphery  has  been  directed 




In  Northern  Ireland  David  Cameron  referred  to  his  alarm  at  the  ‘East 
European’  level  of  dependence  on  the  public  sector. Northern  Ireland  since 
the  arrival  of  the  welfare  state  in  1945  has  been  materially  dependent  on 
Westminster.  From 2010 to 2015 the DUP‑Sinn Fein devolved administration 
presided over a £4 billion reduction in public expenditure.15 On one level this 
was  ‘normal’  and  the  austerity  cuts  in  line  with  those  inflicted  on  other 
devolved administrations.  
 
However,  Northern  Irish  politics  remained  somewhat  dysfunctional  and 
abnormal from the norm. The fundamentals of the nationalist‑unionist divide 
remain  institutionalized  in  the  power‑sharing  arrangements  at  Stormont  – 
they  reflect  more  the  communal  parcelisation  of  power  and mutual  vetoes 
than power‑sharing between the two blocs.16 
 
By  2015  the  UK  was  looking  even  less  like  the  unitary  state  that  pre‑
devolution  UK  politics  textbooks  conventionally  labeled  the  UK.  Relations 








this  respect.  The  existence  of  the  Liberal  Democrats  in  Government  has,  at 
least dampened, the perception of an alien right‑wing government imposing 
its  will  beyond  Westminster.  The  Liberal  Democrats  by  being  part  of  the 
coalition  as  a  junior  partner  enhanced  its  political  legitimacy  beyond 
Westminster.  The  awkward  and  potentially  political  illegitimate  governing 












        % Vote    Seats 
Labour      42.0 (+2.5)    41 (0) 
Liberal Democrats    18.9 (‑3.7)    11 (‑1) 
SNP        19.9 (+2.3)    6 (‑1) 
Conservative     16.7 (+0.9)    1 (0) 
 
Wales         
% Vote    Seats 
Labour      36.2 (‑6.5)    26 (‑4) 
Liberal Democrats    20.1 (+1.7)    3 (‑!) 
Plaid Cymru     11.3 (‑1.3)    3 (+1) 
Conservative     26.1 (+4.7)    8 (+5) 
 
Northern Ireland 
        % Vote    Seats 
Sinn Fein      25.5 (+1.2)    5 
DUP        25.0 (‑8.7)    8 
SDLP        16.5 (‑1.0)    3 
UCU‑NF      15.2 (‑2.6)    0 
Alliance      6.3 (+2.4)    1 
 
 
In  both Wales  and  Scotland  the  dominance  of  Labour  remains  in  terms  of 










yet  again  reminders  of  how  political  party  dynamics  and  electoral  politics 
were  diverging  from  the  Westminster  party  ‘norm’.    As  Table  3.3 





emerge.  These  results,  due  to  the  proportional  perversities  of  the  first‑past‑
the‑post electoral system tend to mask the changing party political dynamics 
in  devolved  areas  –  Table  3.3  illustrates  the  changing  party  systems  more 





    Labour  Conservative   SNP/Plaid  Lib Dem18 
    Vote Seats  Vote Seats    Vote Seats  Vote Seats 
1979    %    %      %    % 
Scotland  41.5  44  31.4  22    17.3  2  9.0  3 
Wales   47.0  21  32.2  11    8.1  2  10.6  1 
1983 
Scotland  35.1  41  28.4  21    11.8  2  24.5  8 
Wales   37.5  20  31.0  14    7.8  2  23.2  2 
1987 
Scotland  42.4  50  24.0  10    11.0  3  19.4  9 
Wales   45.1  24  29.5  8    7.3  3  17.9  3 
1992 
Scotland  39.0  49  25.6  11    21.5  3  13.1  9 
Wales   49.5  27  28.6  6    8.8  4  12.4  1 
1997  
Scotland  45.6  56  17.5  0    22.1  6  13.0  10 
Wales   54.7  34  19.6  0    9.9  4  12.4  2 
2001 
Scotland  43.2  55  15.6  1    20.1  5  16.4  10 
Wales   48.6  34  21.0  0    14.3  4  13.8  2 
2005 
Scotland  39.5  41  15.8  1    17.7  6  22.6  11 
Wales   42.7  29  21.4  3    12.6  3  18.4  4 
2010 
Scotland  42.0  41  16.7  1    19.9  6  18.9  11 
Wales   36.2  26  26.1  8    11.3  3  20.1  3 
 
 
During  its  first  year  ‑  the  honeymoon  period  ‑  the  coalition  relationship 
between the Liberal Democrats and Conservatives was cohesive and reflected 
a  unity  of  purpose.      The  novelty  of  governmental  office  and  the  goodwill 
engendered by the coalition agreement was evident. However, at  the end of 
                                                        














        Scotland     Wales     
        Con    List    Constit.  List 
        %    %    %    % 
Labour      31.7 (‑0.5)  26.3 (‑2.9)  42.3(+10.1)  36.9 (+7.2) 
Conservatives    13.9 (‑2.7)  12.4 (‑1.6)  25.0 (+2.6)  22.5 (+1.1) 
Liberal Democrats    7.9 (‑8.3)  5.2 (‑6.1)  10.6 (‑4.2)  8.0 (‑3.7) 
SNP/Plaid Cymru    45.4 (+12.5)  44.0 (+13.0)  19.3 (‑3.1)  17.9 (‑3.1) 
 
 
The  alternative  vote  (AV)  referendum  in  Scotland  and  Wales  was 
overshadowed by the parliamentary elections on the same day (although this 
did  result  in higher  turnout).  It  is worth noting  that  the  results  in Northern 
Ireland,  Scotland  and Wales  of  the  AV  referendum were  somewhat  out  of 
sync  with  the  overall  result  with  all  three  having more  yes  votes  than  the 
overall UK result  ‑ see Table 3.5. This may reflect that each country has had 






        Turnout  Yes    No 
UK        42.2    32.1    67.9 
Northern Ireland    55.8    43.7    56.3 
Scotland      50.7    36.4    63.6 











for  Northern  Ireland,  Scotland  and Wales  itself  have  changed  significantly 




Instead  of  engaging with  Scottish  politics  directly,  the  Conservatives  chose 
the more politically astute option of devolving responsibility  for Scotland to 
the  Liberal  Democrats  who  held  11  of  Scotland’s  59  seats.  The  Liberal 
Democrats  initial  choice of Secretary of State  for Scotland Danny Alexander 
only  served  in  post  for  18  days  and was  replaced  by Michael Moore, with 
Alistair  Carmichael  in  taking  over  from  him  in  October  2013.  The  latter 
change was widely reported as being about  the coalition  looking for a more 
robust  combative  pro‑union  message.  Ironically,  Carmichael  in  2010  had 





Scotland and Wales. Until 1999,  the party adopted an  increasingly  inflexible 
unitary unionist  stance,  refusing  to engage  in any meaningful way with  the 




the  most  significant  shift  in  any  of  the  unionist  party’s  policy  stances  on 
devolution  ‑  see  Table  3.6.  In  offering  full  income  tax  raising  powers  the 






















¥ New  devolved  powers  in  election  administration,  health  and  safety, 
employment  tribunals,  equalities  policy,  consumer  advice  and 
railways. 












¥ Income  Tax  wholly  devolved  (including  power  to  set  rates  and 
thresholds) 




As  Convery  notes,  it  marks  a  long  journey  for  the  Conservative  Party  in 
reconciling the competing ideological strands of conservatism and unionism.22 
The party’s proposals express, at one and the same time, a belief in the union 
and  measures  designed  to  ensure  more  fiscal  responsibility  and  discipline 
within  devolved  bodies.  They  were  designed  to  solve  the  problem  of  the 
imbalance  in  1999  devolution  settlement  between  social  policy  expenditure 
(almost wholly devolved)  and  tax  (almost  exclusively  reserved).  It was  also 
thought  that  it  could  be useful  in  shifting  the dynamic  of  devolved politics 
towards  more  natural  Conservative  terrain,  placing  more  emphasis  on 
achieving  the  correct  balance  between  taxation  and  expenditure.  To  date, 
devolved  politics  has  tended  to  focus  almost  exclusively  on  the  latter.  The 
social policy agenda of devolution has been dominated by issues that centre‑
                                                        
22  Convery, Alan.  ‘Devolution and  the Limits of Tory Statecraft: The Conservative Party  in 
Coalition and Scotland and Wales’ Parliamentary Affairs 2014 vol.67. 25‑44.  
  15
left  parties  such  as  the  Scottish  and Welsh  nationalists,  Labour  and  Liberal 
Democrats  feel  more  comfortable  operating  on.  The  welfare  state  has 
gradually  taken on a different  slant with marketization given  less  emphasis 
and policies  such as  free  school meals,  free prescriptions,  free personal  care 





Labour.  The  2010  leadership  contest within  the  Scottish Conservative  Party 
has  previously  highlighted  alternative  visions  of  the  future  of  the  party  in 




been  replaced.  Cameron’s  post  2010  soothing  rhetoric  was  generally  well 
received  as  was  the  internal  diplomacy  surrounding  the  ‘Edinburgh 
Agreement’  in 2012. 23 The Better Together campaign threw up some strange 
bedfellows  with  the  party’s  Scottish  leader,  Ruth  Davidson,  at  one  point 
sharing a platform with George Galloway.  
 
The  Conservatives  remained  a  toxic  brand  in  Scotland,  and  the  Liberal 
Democrats  suffered  by  their  association  with  it.  Post‑devolution  the  most 
striking thing about the Conservative Party in Scotland is that there is little or 
no  evidence  of  any  potential  for  revival.  However,  the  situation  in  Wales 
stands  in  contrast, with  the Welsh Conservatives gaining votes  and  seats  in 
2011. Also, whilst the SNP in Scotland became a sole governing political party 
with  independence  dominating  the  political  agenda,  Plaid  Cymru  in Wales 
was in the doldrums – 2011 was its worst Assembly election result.  
 
The  Liberal  Democrats  despite  their  status  as  coalition  partners  remained 
somewhat  peripheral  to  developments  of  both  UK  and  Scottish  and Welsh 
levels.  The  Liberal  Democrat  effect,  beyond  giving  the  UK  Government 
enhanced legitimacy, is rather difficult to demonstrate. The Liberal Democrats 
in Scotland and Wales have paid a heavy  representational price  at  both  the 
2011  Scottish  and Welsh  Parliamentary  Elections  and  the  2012  Scottish  and 
Welsh local government elections. If Labour were seen as the natural partner 
at UK level,24 this was doubly  the case  in both Scotland and Wales were  the 
                                                        
23  See Loughlin and Viney Ch. 2 of this volume.  








the  Scottish  National  Party  in  2007.  Beyond  Westminster  it  had  already 




of  local  heroes  in  the Highlands,  Borders  and  other  parts  of  rural  Scotland 
(the  Liberal  Democrats  had  a  long  tradition  of  long‑standing  MPs  in  such 
areas  of  Scotland),  their  representation  at  the  Scottish  Parliament  and  local 
government was decimated.  In Wales, whilst  the downslide has not been so 
dramatic, there were similar tales of collapsing votes, lost seats, lost deposits 
and  falling party morale.    In  2015  in  both  countries  they  are  largely  on  the 
periphery of mainstream politics. They face an uphill struggle to rebuild – the 
nationalist  parties  in  both  countries  add  another  serious  player  to  electoral 
competition,  and  even minority  parties  such  as  UKIP,  Socialists  and Green 
have been known to squeeze their vote into lost deposit territory.  
 








in  Scotland  in  key  policies  such  as  tuition  fees  and  care  for  the  elderly)  it 
appeared  negligible  in  the  UK  coalition.  As  Donnett  suggested,  ‘the  cost‑
benefit analysis of the coalition does not stack up for the Liberal Democrats as 
they  are  sacrificing  key  principles  and  pledges  in  return  for  limited 













The  image  of  the  Liberal  Democrats  has  been  seriously  weakened  in  both 
countries. Polling data and results throughout 2010‑2015 indicate a declining 
vote share. The Liberal Democrat experience of coalition 2010‑2015 somewhat 
mirrors  the  experience  of  Plaid,  the  junior  partner,  in  the  ‘One  Wales’ 
coalition  2007‑2011.  However,  such  a  squeeze  should  not  be  viewed  as 




since  the  1950s  –  from  a  unionist  perspective  there  is  no  UK  Government 
pressing  for  change  or  Irish  republican  armed  struggle  any  longer.28 The 
DUP‑Sinn  Fein  dyarchy  became  further  embedded.  The  clashes  that  have 
taken place  are  over  identity  issues  and  symbolic  and  traditional  customs  ‑ 
the  flying  of  the  union  flag  over  Belfast  City  Hall,  the  perennial  marching 
season clashes and debates about the status of languages.  
 
The  Coalition  Government  faced  Governments  in  all  three  peripheries 
without  any  Conservative  or  Liberal  Democrat  representation.  This 
represented  a basis  for  antagonistic  relations. However,  the post‑devolution 











Ireland, Wales  and  Scotland  they  have  been  far more  common.  There were 
constitutional  referendums  in  both  Scotland  and Wales  in  1979  and  1997,  a 
2011  Welsh  Referendum  and  a  2014  Scottish  referendum.    Devolution  in 
Northern  Ireland  was  preceded  by  two  separate  Good  Friday  Agreement 
consenting  referendums  in  the  26  counties  of  the  Republic  and  the  six 
counties of the North.  
 
What  these  referendums  highlight  is  the  ad  hoc  and  often  instrumental 
manner  in which  referendums are being used. Although often portrayed as 





suit  their needs  in particular  circumstance. The Welsh vote  in  2011 was not 
about  the  principle  of  whether  or  not  Wales  should  have  legislative 
devolution. The 2006 Government of Wales Act had already established the de 
jure  distinction  between  the  National  Assembly  for  Wales  and  the  Welsh 
Assembly  Government  (since  2011  the Welsh  Government).29 Moreover,  an 
interim  legislative  dispensation  enabled  the National Assembly  of Wales  to 
create  primary  legislation.  The  rubicon  of  primary  legislative  powers  was 
already crossed  in 2007. The 2011 Referendum was  ‘merely … sanctioning a 




to  the Welsh  Assembly.  The  referendum was  as  a  consequence  of  internal 
politicking within the Welsh Labour Party and the coalition with Plaid Cymru 
(though it should be noted the Welsh Conservatives included a commitment 
to  a  referendum  on  their  2010  Welsh  manifesto).  Back  in  the  1990s  Blair 
utilized the promise of referendums in Scotland and Wales to neutralize the 
Conservative’s  unionist  line  of  attack.  Cameron  likewise  utilized  the 
referendum promise to serve political purposes in Scotland and Wales.   
 
Wyn  Jones  and  Scully  refer  to  the  Welsh  2011  referendum  campaign  as 
‘generally uninspiring and at times dispiriting’.31  This stands in stark contrast 
to  the  Scottish  2014  independence  referendum  campaign.  The  record  84.5 
percent  turnout  was  reflective  of  the  high  levels  of  grassroots  activism, 
continual  political  debate  via  social  media,  town  halls,  cars,  clubs,  street 





constitutional  order  post  September  2014.  In  contrast,  the  Welsh  one  took 
place with little public debate and participation evident.  
 
Whilst  both  referendums  were  very  different,  both  served  to  highlight  the 
continuing  shifting  sands  of  devolution  in  both  countries.  The  phrase 
‘devolution  settlement’  is  both  inappropriate  and  inaccurate  in  all  three 
countries beyond Westminster. The term settlement is only appropriate in the 











flux  of  devolution  in  the  Celtic  periphery  ‑  the  governance  of  England 
remained  largely  untouched  and  stable,  until  after  the  campaign was  over. 
Just  after  the  declaration  of  the  No  victory  David  Cameron  placed  the  so‑
called  ‘English  Question?’  at  the  centre  of  UK  constitutional  politics.  The 





and  representation,  untouched  and  unanswered  for  so  long  (commonly 
referred  to  as  the  Barnett  Formula  and  the  West  Lothian  question 
respectively) were  firmly  on  the UK  political  agenda.  The  durability  of  the 
Barnett  formula,  as  the  basis  for  calculating  territorial  increments  (or more 
recently  decrements)  in  funding,  remained  contested.  Its  durability  can  be 
explained  by  the  fact  that  it  kept,  ‘the  potentially  controversial  issue  of 
territorial  finance  out  of  the  spotlight … and  avoid  the  complex  and  angst‑
ridden discussions of (territorial) finance that we find in the USA and a range 
of  other  countries’.  32  That  said  the  Holtham  Commission  in  Wales  did 
suggest  reform  and  that  the  base  level  of  UK  Government  funding  be 
protected  but  the method  for  funding  distribution  be  reformed  to  be more 
reflective  of  need. 33 However,  debates  over  the  reform  of  Barnett  remained 
largely  the  preserve  of  academics,  think  tanks,  newspaper  columnists  and 
minor  political  voices  in  each  country.  Further  devolution  to  Scotland  had 
implications for governance in England, Northern Ireland and Wales.34 
 
One  of  the  over‑riding  narratives  of  the  Yes  campaign  was  dis‑satisfaction 
with Westminster and the potential for Scotland to practice a different type of 
politics.  This  has  echoes  of  the  early days  of  devolution  of  the  talk  of  ‘new 
politics’  in  Northern  Ireland,  Scotland  and  Wales.  The  Better  Together 













the  Better  Together  campaign  had  consistent  murmurings  of  unhappiness 
about  his  leadership  across  all  three  parties.  For  much  of  the  referendum 
campaign  momentum  was  perceived  to  be  with  the  ‘Yes’  side  with  off‑
message mis‑haps more prevalent on  the  ‘No Thanks’  (it was  re‑branded  in 
mid‑campaign) side. These ranged from Philip Hammond’s April 2014 gaffe 
that  sterling  would  be  up  for  negotiation  (despite  both  the  UK  coalition 
partners  and  Labour  previously  presenting  a  united  front  in  dismissing  a 
potential  currency  union  between  Scotland  and  the  rest  of  the  United 
Kingdom  in  the  event  of  a  ‘Yes’  vote)  to  the  UK  Treasury  Report  that 
extrapolated some research on setting up costs of government departments to 
arrive at a nonsensical figure for the cost of setting up government in a post 




The  almost  universal  criticism  of  the  ‘Better  Together’  campaign  was  its 
negativity  and  failure  to  narrate  a  positive  vision  of  Scotland  in  the Union. 
Despite  a  political  consensus  amongst  unionists  that  Scotland was  a  viable 
economic  and  political  unit  (itself  a  significant  change  in  tone  post‑
devolution),  there  were  constant  dire  warnings  and  projections  of  risk  in 
terms of  security and defence,  economic, pension and employment  risk and 
nomadic business flight. Much of this, of course, is par for the course in terms 
of  the  tribalism  and  counter‑claims  of  referendum  and  party  campaigning, 
but part of the problem was the inconsistency in tone and message from the 
three parties of the Union. The constant projections of uncertainty, instability 
and  risk  meant  the  more  positive  messages  of  common  values, 
interdependence  and  shared  history  were  diluted.  At  the  same  time,  Yes 
Scotland  were  presenting  a  ‘de‑risked’  version  of  independence  –  shared 
social and economic union, it was ‘only’ the political one that would change. 
Scotland could be rid of the Westminster elite, austerity, trident, the bedroom 













Scottish  Labour  Party.  At  one  point  when  he  did  campaign  he  even made 






The  three major  parties  all  launched  their  own quite  different  and  separate 




involve  post‑2015.  They  did  seek  to  project  one  in  campaign  driven  joint 
photo‑opportunities and an agreement on a Gordon Brown driven fast‑track 
joint  timetable  for  delivering  more  powers  very  late  in  the  campaign  (in 









north  (having  been  previously,  like  the UK media,  rather  disengaged)  they 
were  projected  ‑  somewhat  exaggeratedly  ‑  as  either  the  three  wise  men 
coming  bearing  gifts  of more  devolution  in  order  to  save  the  union  or  the 
horsemen of the apocalypse symbolizing the dying days of the union. In the 
final  days  of  the  referendum  campaign  the  survival  of  Cameron  as  Prime 
Minister  in  the  event  of  a  Yes  vote  was  even  being  questioned.  38  The 
campaigning  desperation  with  which  the  Westminster  class  fought  to 

























¥ Administration  of  Scottish  Parliament  elections,  Scottish  Parliament 
business.  





¥ Various  other  amendments  and  provisions  relating  to  Crown  Estate, 
Antartica, UK Supreme Court, European Court of Human Rights. 39 
 
Whilst  constitutional  tinkering  remained  evident  in  Scotland  and Wales,  in 
Northern  Ireland  power‑sharing,  as  Peter  Mandelson  had  once  remarked,  
remained  ‘the  only  show  in  town’.40 The  death  of  Ian  Paisley  in  September 
2014  was  marked  with  reflections  on  how  much  he  and  the  politics  of 
Northern  Ireland  had  changed.  Working  alongside  Sinn  Fein’s  Martin 
McGuinness,  the  sworn  enemies  had  developed  a  genuine  friendship  and 
were  labeled  ‘the  chuckle  brothers’  by  the  Irish  media  such  was  their 
predilection for smiling laughing together in public.41  
 
The  five  years  of Coalition Government was marked with more  stability  in 
the  Northern  Ireland  Assembly  after  its  previous  years  of  arrested 
development punctuated  by periods  of  London direct  rule.  The Democratic 
Unionist Party and Sinn Fein both recognize,  that despite  their  fundamental 
disagreement  on  Northern  Ireland’s  constitutional  future,  power‑sharing  is 
the  least  worst  option  available  to  them.  The  UK  Coalition  Government 
inherited  the  legacy of  the  arrangements put  in place by  the Belfast  and St. 
Andrews Agreements  and  it  has  largely  retained  a  hands‑off  role  that may 











EU,  that great  ‘sleeper’  issue of  internal Tory Party politics –  it  sporadically 
appears to cause strife and division – is one that is framed very differently in 
politics  beyond Westminster.  The  ‘ever  closer  union’  of  the  EU  is  a  subject 
that has conjured up issues for the ever‑looser union of the United Kingdom. 
Cameron  simultaneously  campaigned  for  a  EU  Referendum  at  UK  level  in 
2017, while  he  suggested  that  Scottish  independence would  leave  it  ‘at  the 






Whilst  the  coalition  effect  on  policymaking  is  immediately  obvious  when 
viewed  through  the  prism  of  UK  politics,  it  is  less  readily  apparent  when 
viewed  from  the Celtic periphery.  In  that  respect  the  ‘seismic  change  in  the 
dynamics  of  British  politics’43 did  not  appear  quite  as  such  in  the  Celtic 
periphery.  Coalition  and  multi‑party  politics,  fixed  term  Parliaments, 
referendums and  the  like were not novel  in Northern  Ireland, Scotland and 
Wales. Indeed they have become very much part of ‘normal’ politics.  
 
Devolution  in  the  UK  was  not  born  out  of  any  constitutional  or  political 
ideology  or  principle.  The  three  asymmetrical  systems  of  devolution  reflect 
political  pragmatism  and  circumstance  in  each  territory,  both  in  terms  of 
inception and development. The union is elastic. One of the problems the UK 
Coalition faced was that the process of devolution and constitutional change 
has  developed  its  own  dynamic  in  each  of  the  Celtic  countries.  The 
constitutional  changes  set  in  motion  by  the  previous  Labour  Government 
mean  that  agenda  control  has  slipped  away  from  Westminster.  Legally, 
devolution may mean power devolved is retained, however politically as the 
events  of  2010‑2015  demonstrate,  the  political  agenda  in  each  territory 
developed  differing  trajectories.  These  developments  reflect  political 
priorities,  agendas  and  processes  in  Belfast,  Cardiff  and  Edinburgh  rather 
than London. This marginalized the coalition effect in devolved policy areas – 
                                                        
42 Morris, Nigel  ‘Scottish  independence: Scotland  ‘would be put at  the back of  the queue  to 









Scotland  a  ‘No’  vote was  achieved  at  the  cost  of  promises  (by  all  three UK 
parties) to surrender more powers to the Scottish Parliament. Events of 2010‑
2015 amply demonstrated  that devolution was  indeed a process  rather  than 
an  event.  The  coalition  has  conceded more  autonomy  in  both  Scotland  and 
Wales.  Northern  Ireland  in  this  period  was  rather  vividly  described  as 
‘something  akin  to  a  constitutional  granny  flat  perched  on  the  edge  of  the 
Union’.44 As ever politics in the six counties of the north of Ireland appeared 
remote and very different. However, one could argue both Scottish and Welsh 
politics  also  appeared  more  differentiated,  as  the  extenuation  and 




of  being  in power  at Westminster,  the  latter  party much more  keenly.  Both 
coalition parties were minority players in Scottish and Welsh politics in 2010, 
by  2015  they  had  accentuated  that  status.  The  Liberal  Democrats  were 





UK  politics.  Less  than  two  decades  after  its  inception,  opposition  to 
devolution in each territory was so small to be politically inconsequential. The 
strident  unionism  of  the  Conservative  Party  1979‑1997  is  the  constitutional 
politics of a bygone era.  
 
There  is  some  evidence  that  the  Scottish  independence  referendum  led  to 
some  re‑assertion  of  British  identity.45 Historically  and  comparatively,  the 
notion of being British is an under‑stated one, the Better Together campaign 
tended to steer clear from issues of identity, at least until late in the campaign, 
when  the  Scottish  Saltire was  raised  above Downing  Street  –  an  indication 










testimony  to  the  pluralism  of  identities  in  the  UK.  The  new  unionism 
practiced by the UK Government post‑2010 was more flexible and legitimate. 
It  may  be  one  of  the  areas  where  Liberal  Democrat  influence  was  most 
apparent.    Without  them,  questions  of  political  legitimacy  would 
undoubtedly have been raised beyond Westminster.  
 
 
